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Abstract: 
The experiences of People living with HIV have been transformed over recent years. 
Advances in medical science have made the virus a manageable chronic condition, while 
eliminating the risk of onward transmission for those with access to treatment, something 
referred to as TasP (treatment as prevention) or U=U (undetectable equals untransmissible). 
More recently, the availability of PrEP (pre-exposure prophylaxis), alongside PEP (post-
exposure prophylaxis), through the NHS has created the conditions for condomless sexual 
encounters to take place without the fear of HIV transmission associated with previous 
decades. Despite this, the criminal law has continued to frame HIV in terms of personal 
responsibility and bodily autonomy within the dominant narratives of danger, disease, and 
out-dated science.  Doctrinal law has failed to keep pace with social and scientific change. 
Therefore, in this article, we provide a re-examination of the criminal issues relating to HIV 
transmission within this new landscape, arguing that it necessitates a shift in attitude, policy 
and doctrine. We specifically argue that HIV transmission does not meet the appropriate 
harm threshold to constitute GBH and that if criminal law is ultimately about preventing or 
regulating harm, the ongoing criminalisation of HIV transmission is counter to that aim. 
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Introduction  
It is during another global pandemic – that of COVID-191 – that the UK Government has 
announced significant changes to the availability of HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP)2 in 
England,3 moving from limited availability via ‘trials’4, to routine availability for the general 
population via the National Health Service (NHS).567 As the search for effective responses 
(e.g. vaccines) to one pandemic continues to be the focus of policymakers and scientists, 
PrEP has become more widely available in efforts to prevent new HIV diagnoses. This sits 
alongside pre-exposure prophylaxis (PEP)8 and treatment as prevention (TasP)9 as an 
important pharmaceutical tool which has the potential to halt the transmission of HIV. 
 
1 The World Health Organization defines COVID-19 as ‘the infectious disease caused by the most recently 
discovered coronavirus. This new virus and disease were unknown before the outbreak began in Wuhan, China, 
in December 2019. COVID-19 is now a pandemic affecting many countries globally.’  See: 'Coronavirus 
Disease (COVID-19)' (Who.int, 2020) <https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-
2019/question-and-answers-hub/q-a-detail/q-a-coronaviruses> accessed 28 October 2020  
2 The PrEP campaign group Prepster describes the treatment as: ‘a way of preventing HIV infection by taking a 
pill on an ongoing basis before sex and continued after sex. It’s taken by someone who doesn’t have HIV, to 
prevent them from getting HIV. The PrEP pill is an antiretroviral drug – the same type of pill taken by someone 
who already has HIV to treat HIV.’  See: 'Prepster' (Prepster, 2020) <https://prepster.info> accessed 28 October 
2020. 
3 Availability was confirmed in Wales in June 2020. See: Reiss Smith, 'HIV Activists Celebrate As Wales 
Confirms Life-Saving HIV Drug Prep Will Be Rolled Out On The NHS' (PinkNews - Gay news, reviews and 
comment from the world's most read lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans news service, 2020) 
<https://www.pinknews.co.uk/2020/06/30/prep-wales-roll-out-commissioned-available-hiv-drug/> accessed 28 
October 2020. 
4 Local authorities are the responsible commissioner for HIV prevention services in England under Regulation 6 
of the Local Authorities (Public Health Functions and Entry to Premises by Local Healthwatch Representatives) 
Regulations 2013. 
5 See: ‘HIV Prevention Drug PrEP ‘to be made available on the NHS this year’’. See: 'HIV Prevention Drug 
Prep 'To Be Made Available On The NHS This Year' (The Telegraph, 2020) 
<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/03/15/hiv-prevention-drug-made-available-nhs-year/> accessed 28 
October 2020. 
6 The March announcement on PrEP was followed by some confusion about a potential step back from this 
position but it became clear that the rollout would be slightly delayed by Covid-19 but would still happen.  See: 
Jamie Wareham, 'Life-Saving HIV Drug Prep On NHS Delayed Amid Coronavirus Pandemic' (Forbes, 2020) 
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiewareham/2020/06/05/life-saving-hiv-drug-prep-on-nhs--indefinitely-
delayed-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/#3e3080f91416> accessed 28 October 2020. 
7 On the legal battle to get to this point see: Alexander Maine, ‘Bareback Sex, PrEP, National AIDS Trust v NHS 
England and the Reality of Gay Sex’ (2020) 23(8) Sexualities 1362. 
8 Post-exposure prophylaxis is an anti-viral treatment that can be taken after someone believes they have been 
exposed to a risk of HIV transmission.  See: 'Is Prep Different From PEP? – Prepster' (Prepster.info, 2020) 
<https://prepster.info/services/service-2/> accessed 28 October 2020. 
9 This refers to the use of antiviral treatment by someone who is HIV positive to stay healthy and to also reduce 
the risk of transmitting HIV. See generally: 'Tasper! Find Out More About Treatment As Prevention! | Prepster' 
(Prepster, 2020) <https://prepster.info/tasp/> accessed 28 October 2020. 
The move to make PrEP available on the NHS has the power not only to transform 
the statistics on HIV transmission in England and Wales but also to re-shape the criminal law 
pertaining to HIV transmission.10  Such developments arguably have applicability for 
healthcare and legal systems well beyond the UK as governments and NGOs seek to utilise 
law to shape behaviours, manage decision-making and risk-taking. 
The law on HIV transmission has arguably lagged behind a seismic shift in clinical 
practice and medical science, maintaining criminalisation under the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 (OAP).11 This has contributed to moral judgements of those participating in 
what may be viewed as ‘high risk’ practices such as bareback12 (condomless) sex.13 The 
interpretation of OAP as capturing HIV transmission14 has further operated to re-code such 
practices—from expressions of desire to enactments of violence15—supporting normative 
attitudes that such engagements are deviant or illegitimate. 
Moreover, as Gonzalez has noted, society continues to be shaped by the original 
trauma of the HIV/AIDS pandemic,16 especially for queer and other marginalised 
 
10 The focus of this article is on the law in England and Wales, but the criminalisation of HIV debate is global.  
Problematic tropes of ‘the disease spreader’ intersect with issues of race, class and shame.  See: Joey L Mogul, 
Andrea J Ritchie, and Kay Whitlock, Queer (In)justice: The Criminalization of LGBT People in the United 
States (Boston: Beacon Press 2011) 34-36, and Libby Adler, Gay Priori: A Queer Critical Legal Studies 
Approach to Law Reform (Durham: Duke University Press 2018) 68.  On global legal responses to HIV more 
generally: James Chalmers, Legal Responses to HIV and AIDS (Oxford: Hart 2008).  The legal debate has not 
been limited to criminalisation, but also to healthcare rights, for example Alexandra Juhasz and Theodore (Ted) 
Kerr, ‘Who are the Stewards of the AIDS Archive? Sharing the Political Weight of the Intimate’, in Angela 
Jones, Jospeh Nicholas DeFilippis, and Michael W Yarbrough, The Unfinished Queer Agenda: After Marriage 
Equality (Abingdon: Routledge 2018), Maine (above n.4) and Matthew Weait, ‘The Healthcare Rights of People 
Living with HIV and AIDS’ in Chris Ashford and Alexander Maine (eds), Research Handbook on Gender, 
Sexuality and the Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2020).  
11 Law Commission, Reform of Offences Against the Person, LAW COM No 361 (London: HMSO, 2015), 
https://s3-eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/lawcom-prod-storage-11jsxou24uy7q/uploads/2015/11/51950-LC-
HC555_Web.pdf (last accessed 26 October 2020). 
12 See, more generally: Michael Shernoff, Without Condoms: Unprotected Sex, Gay Men & Barebacking 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). 
13 See, Chris Ashford, ‘Bareback Sex, Queer Legal Theory, and Evolving Socio-Legal Contexts’ (2015) 18(1-2) 
Sexualities, 195. 
14 See, generally, Matthew Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission 
(Abingdon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007). 
15 See, Chris Ashford, ‘Barebacking and the Cult of Violence: Queering the Criminal Law’ (2010) 74(4) The 
Journal of Criminal Law, 339.  
16 See more generally, Paul Flynn, Good As You (London: Ebury Press, 2017), especially Chapter 5. This 
historic trauma is not limited to gay men.  Lesbians were key in the struggle. See Also: Beth E Schnieider, 
communities. During the early days of that crisis there were many questions, few answers, 
and rumours took on a power of their own.17 In the 1980s and 1990s, AIDS found a 
solution—of sorts—with condoms becoming a social and medical response, and thereby a 
signifier for salvation, protection, and responsibility (terms which have been similarly applied 
to masks, social distancing, and vaccines during the current crisis). This response was, in 
turn, codified by the criminal law as responsibility acquired accountability. As such, the law 
acts as a site of trauma,18 one that is seemingly unable to move into the ‘new normal’19 of 
PrEP, PEP, TasP and U=U, alternatives to the condom-based discourse of ‘safe sex’.   
Condomless sex is variously celebrated and condemned in Western contemporary 
cultures.20 On the one hand, pregnancy – typically the result of condomless sexual encounters 
– can be reason for celebration, a triumphant result of hetero- and homonormative 
ideals.  The child can be a symbol for reproductive instinct, the survival of humanity, 
our culture and our values. On the other hand, pregnancy without an identifiable father, or 
outside the bounds of marriage, can still be cause for moral and social concern—perhaps less 
prevalent but still imbued with classist and racist undertones. These tensions of normativity 
continue to be regulated by the operation of civil law in this sphere.21 
 
‘Lesbian Politics and AIDS Work’, in Ken Plummer (ed) Modern Homosexualities: Fragments of Lesbian and 
Gay Experience (London: Routledge 1992). 
17 See, for example: Dennis Altman, AIDS in the Mind of America: The Social, Political, and Psychological 
Impact of a New Epidemic (garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1986), and Eric Rofes, Reviving the Tribe: 
Regenerating Gay Men’s Sexuality and Culture in the Ongoing Epidemic (New York: Harrington Park Press, 
1996). 
18 HIV/AIDS has a particular place in queer history, not only through the criminalisation of HIV transmission 
but a broader social agenda in which sexual health intersect with issues of homophobia and education, 
censorship and access to healthcare.  This was particularly notable in the US context and the 1987 ‘Helms 
Amendment’ to what would become Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1988, and in the UK, Section 28 of the Local Government Act 1988.  See 
respectively, Lisa Duggan and Nan D Hunter, Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Political Culture (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2006) 129-130, and Madeleine Colvin with Jane Hawksley, Section 28: A Practical Guide to the 
Law and its Implications (Liberty, 1989).  
19 Octavio R Gonzalaz, ‘HIV Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP), ‘The Truvada Whore’, and the New Gay Sexual 
Revolution, in Ricky Varghese (ed), Raw: PrEP, Pedagogy, and the politics of barebacking (Regina: University 
of Regina Press, 2019) 34. 
20 See, more generally: Tim Dean, Unlimited Intimacy: Reflection on the Subculture of Barebacking (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
21 See Generally: Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, & the Limits of 
Law’ (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2015) 50-73.  
By comparison, the term ‘bareback’ possesses a range of nuanced and complex 
meanings, each with different discursive dynamics, which have shifted over time.22 This is 
important for understanding how the law relating to HIV transmission takes on a broader 
power in relation to bareback sex. As Dean has noted, sex without condoms was once simply 
‘natural’, for there was no alternative. Bareback sex was simply sex. Yet today the term can 
be understood in a number of forms, as the ‘outcome of highly specific cultural processes of 
eroticization’.23 That is to say, the fetishization of bareback through pornographic labels and 
broader (sub)culture through websites, sex parties, and other interactions (sometimes 
intersecting with the phenomenon of chemsex)24 has served to transform the act of bareback 
sex into one with broader cultural characteristics for many; it must be understood beyond 
merely the narrow normative construction of condomless sex that the criminal law has 
assumed. 
Condomless anal sex remains a controversial subject, even in queer cultures. 
Mainstream and community-based media often reminds us that bareback is ‘bad’, and this 
moral policing is increasingly backed by legal interventions globally which seek to address 
the transmission of sexual infections, alongside regulatory regimes to control and censure 
visual depictions of bareback sex. This framework sees the barebacking sexual citizen25 forge 
new visions of what it is to be a homosexual in the twenty first century, challenging 
narratives that have often been associated with equality and normative agendas (e.g. 
 
22 Adam Greteman, ‘Viral Matters: Barebacking and PrEP’ in Adam Greteman Sexualities and Genders in 
Education: Towards Queer Thriving (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018)  
23 Tim Dean, ‘Afterword: The Raw and the Fucked’, in Ricky Varghese (ed), Raw: PrEP, Pedagogy, and the 
politics of barebacking (Regina: University of Regina Press, 2019) 259. 
24 This broader context can be understood within a broader ‘sluttiness’ or sleaze, also known as ‘pig’ behaviour.  
See for example: João Florêncio, Bareback Porn, Porous Masculinities, Queer Futures: The Ethics of 
Becoming-Pig (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020).  Again, this also needs to be understood in the broader context of 
shame.  See: David M Halperin and Valerie Traub, Gay Shame (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
25 See generally: David Bell and Jon Binnie, The Sexual Citizen: Queer Politics and Beyond (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2000). 
marriage, monogamy, and military participation).26 Moreover, whilst scholars have begun to 
understand this phenomenon through theoretical constructions of the homonormative and 
‘good gay, bad queer’ analysis,27 this article seeks to theorise and discuss how scientific and 
social developments might produce legal shifts which re-shape our understanding(s) and 
construction(s) of HIV as they relate to the criminal law. 
The article re-considers the law relating to HIV transmission and, in contrast with 
other accounts of this area, seeks to understand it within a new scientific context and people’s 
lived experiences of sexuality. Drawing on this framework, we argue that risk and harm must 
be re-evaluated when considering the law pertaining to HIV.28  This is particularly acute in 
relation to the classification of the transmission of HIV as grievous bodily harm (hereafter: 
GBH), as we argue that HIV transmission does not meet the appropriate harm threshold29. 
This article  develops over three parts. Firstly, we explore recent scientific research about the 
effectiveness of TasP and the use of PrEP for preventing the transmission of HIV. Secondly, 
we explore the relevant law, to understand how and why the transmission of HIV has been 
criminalised. In doing this, we offer reflections on why some HIV charities and other groups 
have endorsed the criminalisation of transmission. Lastly, we explore how harm has been 
conceptualised in legal, medical, and societal terms. By analysing these different notions of 
‘harm’, we argue that HIV no longer attains the severity required to constitute GBH, and that 
– by being unaware of the harms which criminalisation itself perpetuates, through stigma and 
 
26 See for example: Michelangelo Signorile, It’s Not Over:  Getting Beyond Tolerance, Defeating Homophobia, 
and Winning True Equality (Boston/New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2015); Jeffrey Weeks, The World 
We Have Won (Oxon: Routledge, 2007). 
27 See for example: Chris Ashford, ‘(Homo)normative Legal Discourses and the Queer Challenge’ (2011) 1(1) 
Durham Law Review 77; Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the 
Attack on Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 2003); and Gayle S Rubin, Deviations (Durham/London: Duke 
University Press, 2011), Ch5. 
28 And, we would argue, the transmission of disease more generally. 
29 A similar argument has begun to be advocated in the Australian context, see for example: Thomas Poberezny-
Lynch, ‘Criminalising Infection: Questioning the Assumption that Transmitting HIV Constitutes Grievous 
Bodily Harm’ (2019) 44(2) Alternative Law Journal 138. 
trauma – the criminal law (as it stands) undermines core aspects of the liberal case in favour 
of legally regulating consenting sexual behaviours. 
 
Part One: HIV Treatment and Prevention 
Before the development of ‘highly effective’ antiretroviral therapies (ART) in 1996 an HIV 
test signalled serious health implications for anyone who tested positive.30 The effects of the 
virus on a person’s immune system contributed to a constellation of opportunistic infections, 
cancers (Kaposi’s sarcoma), and other life-threatening conditions collectively referred to as 
‘AIDS’ (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome). However, as the efficacy and variety of 
medications available to treat HIV has increased, the virus has been transformed ‘from an 
inexorably fatal disease to a chronic, manageable condition’ with few—if any—long term 
physiological consequences.31 In countries such as England, where access to ART is 
available to most through the NHS, research suggests that people living with HIV will have a 
‘normal life expectancy’.32 If diagnosed and treated early, some health organisations have 
even suggested that HIV positive people may live longer than average due to the detailed and 
regular health checks they receive.33 In short, access to ART means that those who test 
positive for HIV can expect long and healthy lives.34 
Alongside improved health outcomes for positive people, a series of major studies 
have proved that being on ART lowers the risk of HIV transmission so much that it has been 
 
30 'Why Can’T Current Drugs Cure HIV Infection?' (Tufts Now, 2016) <https://now.tufts.edu/articles/why-can-t-
current-drugs-cure-hiv-infection> accessed 28 October 2020.  
31 Mauro Guarinieri and Lital Hollander, ‘From Denver to Dublin: the role of civil society in HIV treatment and 
control’ in Srdan Matic, Jeffery Lazarus & Martin Donoghoe (ed) HIV/AIDS in Europe: Moving From Death 
Sentence to Chronic Disease Management (Copenhagen: World Health Organisation, 2006) 98. 
32 Antiretroviral Therapy Cohort Collaboration, ‘Survival of HIV-positive patients starting antiretroviral therapy 
between 1996 and 2013: a collaborative analysis of cohort studies.’ (2017) 4(8) The Lancet HIV 349.  
33 Simon Collins, ART in pictures: HIV treatment explained. (London: HIV I-Base, 2017) 3. 
34Wei Xu, et al. ‘Advancements in Developing Strategies for Sterilizing and Functional HIV Cures.’ 
(2017)  BioMed research international 1.  
described as ‘scientifically equivalent to zero’.35 For example, the PARTNER study evidenced 
the preventative effectiveness of treatment by documenting over 58,000 acts of condomless 
sex between 888 serodiscordant couples – where one partner was positive and the other was 
negative36 – across 14 European countries between September 2010 and May 2014.37 
Focusing exclusively on ‘gay couples’, the PARTNER2 study replicated these results, 
documenting over 77,000 acts of bareback sex between 783 couples between May 2014 and 
April 2018. These studies followed a series of research projects with smaller samples38 
including the Opposites Attract study (2017), which also focused on men who have sex with 
men (MSM), and documented 12,000 acts of bareback sex between 358 couples in Australia, 
Brazil and Thailand.39 To date, there has never been a recorded case of someone transmitting 
HIV when their viral load is ‘undetectable’. 
The term undetectable refers to the number of copies of the virus found in one 
millimetre of an HIV positive person’s blood being below the threshold for detection (fewer 
than 20 copies in the most sensitive tests available). Given the overwhelming body of 
medical evidence now available, health organisations around the world – including the US 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of Health, and World Health 
Organisation – have embraced the tagline ‘Undetectable equals Untransmittable’ (U=U). In 
2018, an ‘Expert Consensus Statement’ was published by leading HIV scientists, who further 
 
35 Gus Cairns, 'Zero Transmissions Means Zero Risk – PARTNER 2 Study Results Announced' (aidsmap.com, 
2018) <http://www.aidsmap.com/Zero-transmissions-mean-zero-risk-PARTNER-2-study-results-
announced/page/3311249/> accessed 28 October 2020. 
36 The idea of sero-discordant couples is another aspect of HIV discourse which has been rooted in narratives of 
shame and risk.  PrEP and TasP means that the risk of HIV transmission in serodiscordant couples is virtually 
non-existent. See:  Dion Kagan, Positive Images: Gay Men & HIV/AIDS in the Culture of ’Post-Crisis’ 
(London: IB Taurus, 2018) 114-121. 
37 Alison Rodger et al, ‘Risk of HIV Transmission Through Condomless Sex in Serodifferent gay Couples with 
the HIV-Positive Partner Taking Suppressive Antiretroviral Therapy (PARTNER): Final Results of a 
Multicentre, Prospective, Observational Study’ (2019) 393 (10189) The Lancet 2428.  
38 See further: Simon Collins, 'The Evidence For U=U (Undetectable = Untransmittable): Why Negligible Risk 
Is Zero Risk | HTB | HIV I-Base' (I-base.info, 2017) <https://i-base.info/htb/32308> accessed 27 October 2020. 
39 'Effective HIV Treatment Halts HIV Transmission Among Homosexual Couples, Study Finds | UNSW - The 
Kirby Institute for Infection And Immunity In Society' (Kirby.unsw.edu.au, 
2017)<https://kirby.unsw.edu.au/news/effective-hiv-treatment-halts-hiv-transmission-among-homosexual-
couples-study-finds> accessed 27 October 2020. 
argued that ‘criminal law is sometimes applied in a manner inconsistent with contemporary 
medical and scientific evidence: including overstating both the risk of HIV transmission and 
also the potential for harm to a person’s health and wellbeing’.40 This new understanding of 
HIV ‘harm’ and ‘risk’ – or lack thereof – has become a powerful tool for reframing 
discussions of HIV among activists, academics, and policymakers.41 Therefore, in this article, 
we suggest that the manner in which HIV is framed by UK criminal law is flawed, principally 
because it overstates the harm that this virus causes in contexts where ART is accessible. 
 
The Significance of PrEP 
Given the efficacy of ART in making onward transmission of HIV an impossibility for 
positive people who get tested and treated, another area of medical research has expanded to 
explore whether the same medications can be used by negative people to prevent 
seroconversion. Much like Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) – treatment which has been 
available to healthcare workers since 1997 and the general public since 200542 – Pre-
Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) refers to HIV medications taken as a precautionary or 
preventative measure. While PEP is recommended for use immediately after exposure 
(within 72 hours),43 PrEP can be taken as a daily regimen in case of possible exposure to 
HIV. Both preventative treatments use medications which are the same as, and sometimes 
identical to, those taken by positive people to suppress the virus. The first HIV medication 
 
40 Francoise Barre-Sinoussi et al, ‘Expert Consensus Statement on the Science of HIV in the Context of 
Criminal Law’ (2018) 21 Journal of AIDS and Society 1, 2.  
41 'ZERO: No Linked HIV Transmissions In PARTNER Study After Couples Had Sex 58,000 Times Without 
Condoms | HTB | HIV I-Base' (I-base.info, 2017) <http://i-base.info/htb/30108> accessed 5 July 2017. 
42 Department of Health. Guidelines on post-exposure prophylaxis for health care workers occupationally 
exposed to HIV. London: Department of Health, 1997. 
43 'Can Post-Exposure Prophylaxis (PEP) Stop Me Getting HIV? - Health Questions - NHS Choices' (Nhs.uk, 
2017) <http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/1840.aspx?CategoryID=73> accessed 5 July 2017. 
approved for use as PrEP was trademarked under the name Truvada, a combination of the 
drugs emtricitabine and tenofovir, although generic versions are now also available.44  
To date, there has only been one documented case of someone on PrEP acquiring a 
strain of HIV which was not drug-resistant, where regular adherence has been adequately 
measured.45 Both the PROUD trial of PrEP use among 544 MSM in England,46 and the 
IPERGAY trial of ‘on-demand’ or ‘event-based’ PrEP use among 353 MSM in Canada and 
France, found treatment to be 86% effective.47 Halving the number of pills taken on average, 
participants in the latter study were asked to take PrEP immediately (2 to 24 hours) before 
bareback sex, and for the following two days, rather than daily.48 These studies demonstrated 
the efficacy of PrEP when self-prescribed or taken on an irregular basis.  
Although there is now clear evidence of ART as treatment/prevention reducing rates 
of HIV transmission, it is difficult to discern the comparative success of each method. For 
example, the largest sexual health clinic in London saw a 42% decrease in new HIV 
diagnoses between 2015 and 2016 (from 679 to 393), with little difference in diagnoses of 
other sexually transmitted infections (STIs).49 However, it remains unknown whether positive 
people taking ART or negative people taking PrEP contributed more to this unprecedented 
decline, especially as the clinic was involved in both the PROUD study and had recently 
stepped up efforts to provide HIV treatment immediately following diagnoses. Similarly, 
 
44 'PrEP - Love May Have Another Protector' (Men.PrEPfacts.org, 2017) <http://men.PrEPfacts.org/the-
basics/> accessed 5 July 2017. 
45 Elske Hoornenborg, et al. ‘Acquisition of wild-type HIV-1 infection in a patient on pre-exposure prophylaxis 
with high intracellular concentrations of tenofovir diphosphate: a case report.’ (2017) 4 (11) The Lancet 
HIV e522.  
46 Sheena McCormack, et al. ‘Pre-exposure prophylaxis to prevent the acquisition of HIV-1 infection (PROUD): 
Effectiveness results from the pilot phase of a pragmatic open-label randomised trial.’ (2016) 387 (10013) The 
Lancet 53.  
47 Jean-Michel Molina, et al, ‘Efficacy, Safety, and Effect on Sexual Behaviour of On-demand Pre-exposure 
Prophylaxis for HIV in Men who have Sex with Men: An Observational Cohort Study’ (2017) 4 (9) The Lancet 
HIV e402 
48 Jean-Michel Molina, et al. ‘On-demand Pre-exposure prophylaxis in men at high risk for HIV-1 infection.’ 
(2015) 373 New England Journal of Medicine 2237 
49 '42% Drop In New HIV Diagnoses At 56 Dean Street In Just 12 Months — Chelsea And Westminster 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust' (Chelwest.nhs.uk, 2017)  http://www.chelwest.nhs.uk/about-us/news/40-drop-
in-new-hiv-diagnoses-at-56-dean-street-in-just-12-months  (last accessed 26 October 2020). 
following an 18% decrease in new diagnoses the year before, San Francisco saw a 17% 
decrease in new HIV diagnoses between 2014 and 2015 (from 309 to 255)—shortly after 
Truvada was approved for use as PrEP, but before it had been widely adopted.50One 
explanation for this decline in transmission may be that a significant number of MSM began 
purchasing generic versions of Truvada online – using websites such as iwantprepnow.com – 
before these medications had been approved officially. Whichever prevention method has 
been most responsible for reducing the rate of transmission, HIV medications common to 
both explain this trend, given that there is no evidence of a decline in bareback sex following 
their avilibility. Furthermore, the increased availability of PrEP in these studies found either 
no change or more diagnoses of other STIs:  
Incidence rate ratios showed that MSM using PrEP were 25.3 times more likely to 
acquire a Neisseria gonorrhoeae infection, 11.2 times more likely to acquire a 
Chlamydia trachomatis infection, and 44.6 times more likely to acquire a syphilis 
infection versus MSM not using PrEP.51 
At face value, these numbers may appear concerning, but if the principle of testing as 
prevention is applied (i.e. those who become aware of an infection can take additional 
measures, including treatment, to prevent its onward transmission) then the distribution of 
PrEP combined with routine sexual health screening has been modelled to suggested lower 
rates of transmission across the board.52 
 The research outlined in Part One demonstrates that HIV has changed considerably 
over the past decade, even if there is a lag in cultural attitudes shaped by dominant discourses 
 
50 San Francisco Department of Public Health, HIV Epidemiology Annual Report 2015 (HIV Epidemiology 
Section, 2016) available at: https://www.sfdph.org/dph/comupg/oprograms/HIVepiSec/HIVepiSecReports.asp 
51 Noah Kojima, Joseph Davey Dvora, and D. Klausner Jeffrey. ‘Pre-exposure Prophylaxis for HIV Infection 
and New Sexually Transmitted Infections Among Men who have Sex with Men.’ (2016) 30  14 AIDS 2251, 
2252. 
52 See Jean- Michel Molina, et al. ‘Post-exposure Prophylaxis with Doxycycline to Prevent Sexually 
Transmitted Infections in Men who have Sex with Men: An Open-label Randomised Substudy of the ANRS 
IPERGAY trial’ (2018) 18 (3) The Lancet: Infectious Diseases 308 
of law and medicine (see below). As this suggests, a core component of successful public 
health strategies involves allowing people to routinely monitor their sexual health and access 
ART. Furthermore, combining testing and treatment is more likely to be achieved by the 
distribution of PrEP through official healthcare systems (such as the NHS), where 
information and resources can be shared across the population. With a basic understanding of 
the epidemiological evidence about HIV, it is clear that such medications have been effective 
at preventing or eliminating transmission, making a health problem once perceived as an 
existential threat into something manageable and survivable. In the following sections, we 
describe the social and legal implications these developments may have as they become more 
widely known. 
 
Part Two: HIV and the Criminal Law 
Criminal statute in England and Wales does not explicitly address the subject of HIV 
transmission. Nonetheless, the criminalisation of HIV transmission has become the subject of 
growing academic and policy debate.53  Falling under the rubric of the Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861, the criminal law has established that HIV transmission can constitute an 
offence of GBH.54 The effect of this has been that, while some instances of condomless sex 
are valorised (as noted above) others are legally and socially re-coded as acts of violence.55  
 
53 See for example:  Matthew Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV’ (2005) 68(1) Modern 
Law Review; Simon Cooper & Alan Reed, ‘Informed Consent and the Transmission of Sexual Disease: Dadson 
Revivified (2007) 71(5) Journal of Criminal Law 461; Udo Schuklenk, ‘Should we use the Criminal Law to 
Punish HIV Transmission’ (2008) 4(3) International Journal of law in Context 277; Law Commission, ‘Reform 
of Offences Against the Perso: A Scoping Consultation Paper’ (Law Commission 2014); David Hughes, 
‘Condom Use, Viral Load and the Type of Sexual Activity as Defences to Sexual Transmission of HIV’ (2013) 
72(2) Journal Of Criminal Law 136; George Mawhinney, ‘To Be Ill or to Kill: The Criminality of Contagion’ 
(2013) 77 (3) Journal of Criminal Law 202;  John Francis & Leslie Francis, ‘HIV Treatment as Prevention: Not 
An Argument for Continuing Criminalisation of HIV Transmission’ (2013) 9(4) International Journal of Law in 
Context 520; Samantha Ryan, ‘Disclosure and HIV Transmission’ (2015) 79(6) Journal of Criminal Law 395; 
Samantha Ryan, ‘‘Active Deception’ v Non-Disclosure: HIV Transmission, Non-Fatal Offences and Criminal 
Responsibility’ (2019) Criminal Law Review 4. 
54 It should be noted that other offences may be possible in certain circumstances. See Generally: Law 
Commission, ‘Reform of Offences Against the Perso: A Scoping Consultation Paper’ (Law Commission 2014).  
55 Gayle S Rubin, Deviations (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2011) 
 The placement of HIV transmission within the remit of GBH—or more generally 
Offences Against the Person (OAP)—is telling of the law’s desire to disown its cultural and 
social effects; to deny its regulation of what it regards as the pre-eminently personal sphere.56 
Specifically, all cases of HIV transmission which have been successfully prosecuted fell 
under either section 2057 or section 1858 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, rather 
than under an offence created by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 or its predecessors.59 In this 
sense, the criminal law ignores the sexual nature of STIs, instead coding them simply as 
bodily harm.  
 The offence of GBH is the most serious non-fatal offence which can be charged 
under the laws of England and Wales. GBH requires that the defendant ‘inflict grievous 
bodily harm’ either intentionally (section 18) or while being subjectively reckless as to the 
risk of causing harm (section 20). Wilson has established that GBH does not require an 
assault or battery to have been committed.60 Rather, it requires that the: 
Accused has directly or violently inflicted it [the harm] by assaulting the victim 
or…[that] the accused has ‘inflicted’ it by doing something intentionally which 
though it is not in itself a direct application of force to the body of the victim does 
result in some force being applied violently to the body of the victim so that he suffers 
grievous bodily harm.61  
 
56 It should be noted n stating this that English Common Law has traditionally recognised no distinct right to 
private life. See Generally: R v Khan [1996] UKHL 14, [1997] A.C. 558. However, a right to privacy is 
provided under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See: 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human 
Rights, as amended) (ECHR) Art 8. Following the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998, this right to privacy 
should be considered both when interpreting statutes and developing the common law.   
57 R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 (CA); R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 14 (CA)  
58 R v Rowe (Daryll) [2018] EWCA Crim 2688, [2019] 1 CR.APP.R (S). 38.   
59 Indeed, in EB it was found that non-disclosure of HIV positive status did not undermine effective consent as 
defined by S74 of the Offences against the Sexual Offences Act 2003. See: EB [2006] EWCA Crim 2945, 
[2007] 1 Cr App. R. 29. 
60 R v Wilson [1984] AC 242 (HOL).  
61 Ibid 260.  
Following the judgement in Burstow, ‘inflicting’ is synonymous with ‘causing’, meaning that 
all that is required is for the defendant to have caused harm.62 It then requires that the victim 
suffer harm arising to the level of GBH. Pivotally, the 2004 case of R v Dica63 decided that 
previous authority in the form or R v Clarence64 should not prevent: 
The successful prosecution of those who, knowing that they are suffering from HIV 
or some other serious sexual disease, recklessly transmit it through consensual sexual 
intercourse, and inflict grievous bodily harm on a person from whom the risk is 
concealed and who is not consenting to it. 65 
The result of this decision was that, since 2004, HIV transmission through consensual sex has 
been a ground for criminal sanction. Finally, for GBH, it must be shown that the defendant 
intended harm (Section 18)66 or was reckless as to the risk of some harm (Section 20), 
although this need not be the level of harm that in fact occurred.67 Indeed, it is only a 
requirement that the defendant was reckless to any level of harm occurring (see below for 
further discussion of how ‘harm’ is defined). Consequently, a defendant who did not know 
their HIV status but anticipated the possibility of harm (such as abrasions or bruises during 
sexual interaction) and unintentionally transmitted HIV to their partner(s) could be liable 
under Section 20. 
 
 
62 R V Ireland and Burstow [1998] AC 147 (CA).  
63 R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 (CA).  
64 R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 (CA).  
65 R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 (CA).  
66 In line with the standard criminal law approach to intention this requires that D intended harm or that they 
foresaw that harm was virtually certain to occur because of their action. See: Wollin [1999] AC 82 (HOL).  
67 R v Savage; R v Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699 (CA). 
Confusions between Consent, Violence and Sexuality  
As can be seen from this overview of the relevant criminal law, the absence of consent is not 
a part of the offence of GBH. Despite this, both Dica68 and Konzani69—the leading cases on 
the transmission of HIV—focused on consent as a central issue. In the context of non-fatal 
OAP, such as GBH, consent is regarded as a defence instead of its absence being a core part 
of the offence. However, consent is available as a defence only within a limited number of 
categories of accepted and lawful activity.70 Thus, in almost every case where an HIV 
positive person (who knows their status) engages in bareback sex, in circumstances where 
they do transmit the virus, there is a prima facie offence. By contrast, placing the absence of 
consent as a central aspect of the offence, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 has more carefully 
avoided criminalising consensual sexual activities. 
Indeed, law’s placement of HIV transmission under OAP represents a disclamation of 
the sexual dimensions of transmission, constructing the offence as one of causing harm or 
committing violence.71 This ignores the fact that most incidents of HIV transmission occur 
during consensual sex.72 This re-coding of HIV transmission as a result of interpersonal 
violence, rather than an outcome of mutually desired interactions, undermines elements of 
UK public health messaging and places the burden for preventing HIV transmission 
exclusively on positive people.73 Further, criminalisation obscures the ability of the ‘victim’ 
(as constructed by law) to consent to such activity. 
 
68 R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 (CA).  
69 R v Konzani [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. 14. (CA).  
70 R v Brown [1993] UKHL 19, [1994] 1 AC 212.   
71 The previous law under R v Clarence had held that consensual sexual intercourse did not constitute a battery 
and therefore no liability could arise under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 when consensual sexual 
intercourse led to a sexual infection. See: R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 (CA).  
72 As established in the previous section where either the positive partner is on effective treatment or the 
negative partner is on PrEP, the ’potential’ nature of transmission is scientifically negligible.  
73 Matthew Weait, ‘Knowledge, Autonomy and Consent: R v Konzani (2005) Criminal Law Review 763, 765-
767. 
It should be noted that within his dissenting judgement in R v Brown, Lord Mustill 
attempted to challenge the categorisation of any sexual conduct under the OAP Act.74 As his 
argument suggested, capturing consenting sexual activity represented an intrusion of law into 
what had historically been considered a pre-eminently private domain, stating that the court 
should not be swayed by ‘repugnance and moral objection… neither of which are, in my 
opinion, grounds upon which the court could properly create a new crime’.75 In other words, 
the language of criminal law, in its treatment of HIV transmission as an abstracted form of 
violence, is a kind of obfuscation. Drawing on legal concepts, and a legal language which 
was never intended to be applied to sexual interactions, law thus constructs and moderates 
complex inequalities and power dynamics between sexual partners. Through the reframing of 
HIV transmission as an act of harm, criminalisation also implicates the positive partner as a 
‘vector of disease’.76 In doing so, we argue that the language of law diminishes the humanity 
of HIV positive people by re-constituting them as a ‘danger’ or ‘threat’ to (‘innocent’) HIV 
negative people. Not only does this dichotomous discursive framing perpetuate an unfair 
status quo, which fundamentally undermines the internal coherence of law in relation to 
OAP,77 it also undermines the efforts of public health campaigns (see below). The problem 
with such language in this context is that the transmission of STIs is analysed through the 
same lens as any other form of harm accruing because of violent conduct, such as a non-
lethal stabbing. Thus, an HIV positive person who has bareback sex without informing their 
partner of their status is deemed ‘reckless’, despite the possibility of transmission now being 
low or non-existent, as outlined in Part One. 
 
74 R v Brown [1993] UKHL 19, [1994] 1 AC 212, 256-275.  
75 ibid 274.  
76 Peter Davies & Paul Simpson, ‘On Male Prostitution and HIV’ in Peter Aggleton, Peter Davies, & Graham 
Hart, AIDS: Individual, Cultural and Policy Dimensions (London/New York: Routledge 1990) 117.  
77 See Generally: Matthew Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’ (2005) 68(1) 
Modern Law Review 121.  
The law recognises consent as continuing to function as an effective defence in 
certain circumstances. Prior to R v Dica, the longstanding authority of R v Clarence78 held 
sway. This decision affirmed that there had been lawful consent to sexual intercourse and, 
thus, no battery had occurred. As such, the pre-Dica legal position was that where there had 
been consent to sexual intercourse, there had also been consent to any results of that 
intercourse. In other words, an individual could not be liable for transmitting an STI—
regardless of the level of harm this entailed—if there had been valid consent to sexual 
intercourse. The question of consent—or the ability of the ‘victim’ to consent to an act 
amounting to GBH—is problematized by the decision of the House of Lords in R v Brown.79 
In Brown, the court held that consent to bodily harm of a severity amounting to GBH or 
actual bodily harm (Hereafter: ABH) is not a consent recognised by law.80 Rather, consent to 
the risk of such harm will only be valid in the context of certain socially accepted activities, 
or categories of activities, which are themselves lawful. For example, play fighting81 or 
surgery.82 Bareback sex is not considered to be among these categories, while sexual 
gratification is explicitly outlawed as a category.83 
 As this suggests, R v Brown has effectively stifled the ability of someone to consent to 
HIV transmission itself, meaning that within Dica—in order to leave open a possibility of an 
effective defence to section 20, where HIV transmission has occurred and some harm was 
foreseen—there was a need to distinguish between transmission itself and the risk of 
transmission.84 AS Judge LJ put it: 
 
78 R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 (CA).  
79 R v Brown [1993] UKHL 19, [1994] 1 AC 212. 
80 Ibid.  
81 Jones [1986] 83 Cr App R 375 (CA).  
82 R v Brown [1993] UKHL 19, [1994] 1 AC 212, 266 Per Lord Mustill.  
83 ibid. 
84 This in itself being objectionable because it leaves the difference between a lengthy prison sentence and an 
acquittal to the behaviour of a virus, rather than the behaviour of the defendant.   
These authorities [Brown] demonstrate that violent conduct involving the deliberate 
and intentional infliction of bodily harm is and remains unlawful notwithstanding that 
its purpose is the sexual gratification of one or both participants. Notwithstanding 
their sexual overtones, these cases were concerned with violent crime, and the sexual 
overtones did not alter the fact that both parties were consenting to the deliberate 
infliction of serious harm or bodily injury on one participant by the other. To date, as 
a matter of public policy, it has not been thought appropriate for such violent conduct 
to be excused merely because there is a private consensual sexual element to it. The 
same public policy reason would prohibit the deliberate spreading of disease, 
including sexual disease.85 
This created a context where one is able to consent to the risk of a harm—such as the 
transmission of HIV—but not the harm itself.86 As Weait argued, ‘to criminalise the taking of 
such risks… [is] not only… impracticable in enforcement terms, but… involve[s] 
unwarranted intrusion into the pre-eminently private sphere of adult sexual relations’.87 
 Further confusing the issue of consent in the context of OAP is the decision of the 
court in R v Wilson.88 In Wilson, a man branded his wife with his name, using a heated bread 
knife. Here, the court held that his wife had offered valid consent, categorising the activity as 
bodily adornment. Academics have made much of the gap between Wilson and Brown, even 
arguing that the heteronormative standards of the court were at play in both decisions.89  
Indeed, we agree with Weait’s argument that the diverging treatment of Brown and Wilson 
 
85 R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 (CA) [46]. 
86 Of course, to consent to a risk of harm the victim must first be aware of the risk. The result of this is that the 
law as it stands requires HIV positive people to disclose their status in order to later rely on a defence of 
consent. This has been problematised by Cherkassky. See: Lisa Cherkassy, ‘Being Informed: The Complexities 
of Knowledge, Deception, and Consent when Transmitting HIV’ (2010) 74(3) Journal of Criminal Law 242.  
87 Matthew Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Transmission of HIV: R v DIca’ (2005) 68(1) Modern Law Review 
121, 124. 
88 R v Wilson (1996) 2 Cr App R 241 (CA).  
89 See Further: Ben. Ramanauskas, ‘BDSM, Body Modification, Transhumanism, and the Limits of 
Liberalism’ (2020) 40(1) Economic Affairs 85. 
demonstrates the extent to which ‘the right to respect for private life in law is contingent on 
conformity to established gender roles, traditional relationship types and heterosexual 
orientation’.90 As this suggests, the difference between a Wilson scenario and a Brown 
scenario can lie in the ability of the judge to interpret the conduct through a normative lens. 
Weait has drawn attention to how, ‘in cases of HIV transmission, there appears to be 
an implicit assumption that the magnitude of the risk makes no difference. Either a person 
consents to the risk of transmission or they do not’.91 Given recent developments in the 
science of HIV, as described in Part One, this legal position seems even less justifiable. There 
is a need for law to recognise that the risk of harm has been dramatically reduced or even 
eliminated – where the positive partner is on TasP or the negative partner is on PrEP – and 
that even if transmission does occur, ART should be accounted for within the harm threshold, 
to the extent that continuing to classify a manageable chronic condition with few long-term 
health consequences as ‘grievous’ (meaning ‘very serious’ in lay terms) is flawed. In stating 
this, we accept that a broken arm is also treatable. However, a key point of differentiation 
here is in how the harm is caused. A broken arm is the immediate result of a direct action by 
the defendant, so treatment works as treatment. In the case of HIV acquisition, however, the 
harm is the result of a virus over time. In most cases, the initial HIV infection is 
asymptomatic. Indeed, fast application of treatment (in the form of PEP) can prevent any 
demonstrable harm. Therefore, in many cases of transmission, treatment functions as a mode 
of prevention, stopping the virus from replicating prior to the onset of harm. In this sense, it 
can be argued that, with modern treatment, most cases of HIV transmission do not result in a 
harm in the traditional sense of the term, certainly not a harm meeting the threshold of GBH. 
 
 
90 Matthew Weait, ‘Harm, Consent and the Limits of Privacy’ (2005) 13 Feminist Legal Studies 97, 98  
91 Matthew Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’ (2005) 68(1) Modern Law Review 
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Discourses of HIV and LGBT Organisations 
Despite the reduced risks and harms surrounding HIV, some activist groups and charities 
appear to support the criminalisation of transmission, as part of a trade-off for other 
benefits.92 This represents an inversion of traditional priorities, with groups—Lesbians, gays, 
bisexuals and trans people (LGBT)—who have been discriminated against by the legal 
system historically now turning to become its beneficiaries, adherents, and advocates. In 
doing so, these organisations may simultaneously endorse the law’s victimisation of other 
marginalised groups.93 This turn has occurred concurrently with the arrival of a 
homonormative culture within mainstream LGBT activism,94 which has seen an increasing 
number of  groups and individuals invested in methods of punishment95 and rights-based 
frameworks which operate around a version of negative legal equality (e.g. marriage and non-
discrimination norms). This shift can be explained by examining a phenomenon which Adler 
has termed ‘LGBT equal rights discourse’. Specifically, this discourse is defined as a series 
of now familiar narratives around equality and inclusion advocacy which ‘comprises a cluster 
of constituent strands that depict, characterise and represent LGBT people’.96 LGBT equal 
rights discourse has, in recent years, adopted an increasingly normative thrust, targeting 
agendas such as marriage equality or tougher sentences for those accused of hate crime.97 
Often, the framing of arguments by LGBT organisations aligns with an assimilationist 
 
92 Dean Spade and Craig Willis, Confronting the Limits of Gay Hate Crimes Activism: A Radical Critique 
(2000) 21 Chicago-Latino Law Review 38, 38-52; Libby Adler, Gay Priori: A Queer Critical Legal Studies 
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93 See Sarah Lamble, ’Queer Necropolitics and the Expanding Carceral State: Interrogating Sexual Investments 
in Punishment’ (2013) 24(3) Law and Critique 229. 
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Neoliberalism’ in Russ Castronovo & Dana Nelson (eds) Materialising Democracy: Toward a Revitalized 
Cultural Politics (Durham: Duke University Press 2002) 175-194.  
95 Mariana Valverde and Miomir Cirak, ‘Governing Bodies, Creating Gay Spaces: Policing Security Issues in 
‘Gay’ Downtown Toronto’ (2003) 43 (1) British Journal of Criminology 102.  
96 Libby Adler, ‘Gay Priori: A Queer Critical Legal Studies Approach to Law Reform’ (Durham: Duke 
university Press 2018) 3.  
97 ibid 105-107. 
politics which seeks to secure rights and tolerance by accentuating similarities between 
homosexual and the heterosexual norms.  
The normative thrust of  LGBT equal rights discourse can be seen in the push for hate 
crime legislation. For example, Lamble has strongly critiqued contemporary LGBT 
endorsement of the carceral state along these lines.98 Many of the arguments in favour of 
carceral responses to hate crime are justified on the basis that it targets a specific 
characteristic which marks the individual – and the group to which they ‘belong’ – out as 
different.99 Therefore, the discursive function of hate crime and anti-discrimination 
legislation is often to disclaim differences by arguing that everyone has a right to be treated 
the same. While these arguments are well meaning, they can obfuscate the ways in which 
queer people are different. Among these differences, for example, are preferences for 
alternative forms of relationship, interests in alternative lifestyles, and non-normative sexual 
desires. 
Something often elided in the progress narrative around LGBT rights is a 
consideration of how discursive and tactical decisions can be detrimental to those less able – 
or less willing – to adhere to somatic or behavioural norms. As Adler argues, drawing on 
Foucault, ‘norm production is a useful mechanism for understanding the process by which 
the western progress narrative of gay rights imposes costs on groups that are out of step with 
that narrative’.100 Two such groups include HIV positive people and those who desire 
bareback sex. 
 
98 See Sarah Lamble, ’Queer Necropolitics and the Expanding Carceral State: Interrogating Sexual Investments 
in Punishment’ (2013) 24(3) Law and Critique 229.  
99 See Generally: Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics & The Limits of 
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100 Libby Adler, ‘Gay Priori: A Queer Critical Legal Studies Approach to Law Reform’ (Durham: Duke 
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Although we acknowledge that there can be tactical, short term, incentives for HIV 
and LGBT organisations to embrace a normative ‘equal rights discourse’, there is also a 
contradiction between this approach and public health outcomes which have also been stated 
as central concerns of such organisations.101As Dodds et al. have argued, ‘criminalisation has 
a limited capacity to support HIV precautionary behaviour, such as enabling people to use 
condoms or disclose their HIV status to a sexual partner, and on balance is likely to have a 
negative impact on public health goals’.102 Their research—comprising of a series of focus 
groups with HIV service providers—found ‘most participants arguing that allocation of 
responsibility was not uniform and that it needed to be understood within specific 
circumstances that can constrain precautionary behaviour’.103 In uncritically or implicitly 
defending the criminalisation of HIV transmission, such organisations may inadvertently be 
harming the service users they claim to support, by placing responsibility on HIV positive 
people themselves. In the next section, we explore different legal, medical, and social 
definitions of harm, putting forward a case that HIV transmission is no longer sufficiently 
harmful to constitute GBH. 
 
Part Three: Conceptualising Harm 
Definitions of harm are central to understanding liberal legal systems. Noting the volenti non 
fit injuria maxim, Feinberg distinguished between normative and non-normative harms as 
either ‘wrong’ or a ‘setback to interests’, arguing that Mill’s Harm Principle captures ‘both 
the risks it generates for the other person and the setbacks it causes to that person’s interests 
 
101 See generally: UNAIDS, ‘Criminal Law, Public Health and HIV Transmission: A Policy Options Paper 
(UNAIDS 2002) https://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/resources/criminal-law-public-health-and-hiv-transmission-
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102 Catherine Dodds et al, ‘Keeping Confidence: HIV and the Criminal law from HIV Service Providers 
Perspectives’ (2015) 25 Critical Public Health 410, 411. 
103 Ibid, 417. 
either intentionally or negligently’.104 Strictly speaking, no harm is required for non-fatal 
offences against the person. For example, a defendant taking hold of a victim’s arm when 
they had made it clear they objected to such contact can constitute a battery.105 However, 
when approaching more serious non-fatal offences against the person, such as GBH, the law 
has applied thresholds for harm which must be met, in order for the actus reus of the offence 
to be made out. In this sense, the legal definition of harm features as a central aspect of 
offences such as GBH. This is relevant to our discussion of HIV transmission because, as 
argued above, questions must be raised about whether acquiring the virus meets the level of 
harm required. 
In cases where harm has occurred which does not meet the threshold for GBH, an 
offence of ABH may be found to have occurred. The requirements for ABH are similar to 
those required for GBH106, except a lower harm threshold is set; specifically, ‘any hurt or 
injury calculated to interfere with the health of comfort of [V]’.107 In this sense, an offence of 
ABH can be made out with any harm which is not determined to be ‘transient and trifling’.108 
As this suggests, the law has traditionally taken the enactment of harm against another person 
to be a ‘serious’ matter, with serious criminal sanctions applied to even ‘moderate’ inflictions 
of harm.109 
 The caselaw shows that minor injuries such as bruising can be sufficient to meet the 
harm threshold for ABH.110 However, recognising this, prosecutorial discretion is often 
employed so that prima facie cases of ABH rarely come to be criminally charged. As stated 
by the 2020 Crown Prosecution Service Charging standards, while it is for prosecutors to 
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decide whether to charge (after considering all the circumstances), it will also be relevant to 
consider whether the injuries are ‘serious or less serious’:  
Serious injuries include damaged teeth or bones, extensive and severe bruising, cuts 
that require suturing… the appropriate charge will usually be contrary to section 39 
(Battery) where injuries amount to no more than the following: grazes; scratches; 
abrasions; minor bruising; swellings; reddening of the skin; superficial cuts.111 
Therefore, while the legal harm threshold for ABH is set relatively low, lesser forms of harm 
can be charged as battery or allowed to pass without charge. This is generally in service to 
matters of practicality and the effective use of legal resources.  
Excluding fatal offences such as murder, GBH and wounding are the most serious 
offences against the person recognised under the criminal laws of England and Wales. 
Following DPP v Smith, the term GBH simply refers to ‘really serious’ harm.112 However, in 
recent caselaw, Golding has indicated that this harm need not be permanent or dangerous to 
be considered really serious.113 Following Golding, the question of whether the harm 
threshold has been met is ultimately a matter for the Jury, applying ‘contemporary social 
standards’.114 It is in order to discern these ‘contemporary social standards’ that we turn to 
medical and sociological conceptualisations of harm below.  
Further insight into the criminal law’s approach to constructing and defining harm can 
be taken from Bollom, which outlined that an analysis of harm should be done with an 
awareness of the particular characteristics of a complainant. Specifically, the court stated: 
these injuries on a six foot adult in the fullness of health would be less serious than 
on, for instance, an elderly or unwell person… in deciding whether injuries are 
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grievous, an assessment has to be made of, amongst other things, the effect of the 
harm on the particular individual.115 
As with ABH, the 2020 charging standards provide guidance as to when a charge of GBH 
may be appropriate. Again, these standards depart from, yet remain intrinsic to, the strict 
terms of the law. For example, they inform prosecutors that: ‘Life changing injuries should 
be charged as GBH… significant or sustained medical treatment… may indicate GBH 
injuries even if a full or relative recovery follows’.116  
This could be viewed in terms of a sliding scale of severity, accounting for the form of 
interaction between, and characteristics of, the individuals involved. At the lower end of that 
scale are trifling or minor injuries such as a graze. If charged as an offence at all, this would 
be treated as a battery, with the criminalisation tending to relate more to the conduct of the 
defendant than the harm caused. More serious harms such as bruising, which cannot be 
considered very serious, will generally be treated as attaining the threshold of ABH. 
However, it should be recognised that, following the CPS charging standards, harms of this 
level may not be charged or appear in court unless they are towards the more severe end of 
the spectrum, such as a chipped tooth resulting from the defendant’s actions. Finally, GBH is 
intended to be reserved for the most serious forms of harm. However, as argued above, the 
latest science should raise questions over whether HIV infection continues to be amongst 
these most severe harms. The legal definitions of harm are multiple and complex, 
conceivable in terms of an overlapping scale, but – at least in respect of GBH – are ultimately 
for a jury to determine. 
Following Golding and Bollom, and applying the medical developments described in 
Part One, we suggest that the criminal law relating to HIV transmission as a form of harm 
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needs to be reconsidered and reconceptualised, taking contemporary social standards and the 
characteristics of victims into account. In general terms, with the availability of new 
treatments (which prevent harm accruing), we suggest that most cases of HIV transmission 
will rarely amount to the level of seriousness required to constitute GBH. 
 
Medical and Mental Harm  
Medicine has also provided influential definitions of harm which both inform and exist 
alongside the criminal law. From Hippocrates’ principle of ‘first, do no harm’ to modern 
medicine’s focus on the diagnosis, treatment and prevention of disease, harm reduction 
strategies have been important to health practitioners and policymakers. However, medically 
informed perspectives have also been drawn on to critique the criminal justice system’s 
emphasis on moralising punishment as a form of disincentive, on issues ranging from drug 
consumption117 to sex work.118 For example, the World Health Organisation opposes the 
criminalisation of sex work on the basis of harm reduction, where ‘studies indicate that 
decriminalising sex work could lead to a 46% reduction in new HIV infections in sex workers 
over 10 years’.119 Alongside reducing sexual violence, reducing HIV transmission is used 
here synonymously with reducing harm. As Amnesty International further suggests, social 
stigma ‘discourages many sex workers from obtaining sexual and reproductive health 
information and services including on HIV/AIDS’.120 Relatedly, drug decriminalisation has 
been endorsed as a strategy to reduce rates of addiction, problematic consumption and HIV 
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transmission.121 The harm reduction approach has also been championed by ‘Legal Scholars, 
clinicians, virologists, and epidemiologists, along with civil society and international 
organisations’ who oppose the criminalisation of HIV.122 Therefore, it is important to explore 
how harm is conceptualised by health and medical professionals. 
For many, medical experts will be considered the final authority on the harms 
associated with HIV. It is doctors and nurses, alongside lab technicians and mental health 
practitioners, who test and treat people for HIV. However, the political dimensions of 
healthcare cannot be easily ignored. For example, the Department of Health was central to 
communicating the ‘harms’ and ‘risks’ of the UK’s HIV epidemic to the public.123 In 1987, 
the ‘Don’t Die of Ignorance’ television broadcasts had a lasting impact on people’s 
knowledge of HIV/AIDS, with John Hurt’s dystopian voiceover announcing: ‘There is now a 
danger, which has become a threat to us all. It is a deadly disease and there is no known 
cure’. This campaign also raised awareness through a leaflet sent to almost every household: 
AIDS is caused by a virus. This can attack the body’s defence system which normally 
helps fight off diseases and infections. And if this happens people then develop AIDS 
– the disease itself. They become ill and die from illnesses they cannot fight off. 
The campaign became deeply ingrained in the national consciousness and continues to shape 
people’s responses to HIV. In this sense, it may have contributed to the ‘contemporary social 
standards’ by which harm falls to be determined in court. Yet there has been no state-funded 
information campaign to update the public about new methods of prevention and treatment, 
as we have described. The Department for Health did announce that PrEP would become 
routinely commissioned on the NHS starting in 2020, even if this was delayed until later this 
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year by the emergence of Covid-19.124 However, queer theorists have highlighted how 
information about HIV prevention, both in the 1980s and more recently, have tended to be 
led by LGBT people, publications, and venues, without the assistance of state bodies.125 
Another dimension of harm which has been given greater political attention over 
recent years is mental health, with successive governments pledging ‘parity of esteem 
between mental and physical health services’. 126 This was enshrined in law by the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012, following publication of the Government’s No Health without Mental 
Health report. Around this time, the British Psychological Society, British HIV Association 
and Medical Foundation for AIDS & Sexual Health published a report which noted that 
‘despite significant medical advances in HIV treatment, people living with HIV experience 
significantly higher rates of psychological difficulties than the general population’, including 
anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder.127 It further noted an ‘array of 
concerns about quality of daily life and other personal, social and medical issues, with 
widespread reports of discrimination and social isolation’ which can have a detrimental effect 
on overall health and wellbeing. Highlighting how criminalisation can exacerbate harm, 
Ramanauskas has further argued, in the context of BDSM: 
If a person were to sustain an injury which required medical treatment, they might be 
reluctant to seek medical assistance. This is because they might be worried about the 
legal implications for themselves or their partner. Moreover, given the stigma 
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attached to criminal activities, there might again be a reluctance on the part of patients 
to be open with their doctor about the nature of their injuries.128 
Relatedly, someone showing the symptoms of seroconversion may fear consequences for 
their partner under the law if they were to seek medical assistance. Reviews of the 
international literature in psychology suggest that people living with HIV experience elevated 
rates of anxiety, depression, and suicidality, due in part to the social stigma which 
criminalisation fuels.129 
Stigma is one of the main reasons for health inequalities between HIV negative and 
positive people identified by the research literature. In a survey of 1,777 people living with 
HIV in the UK, Weatherburn et al. found that the most common problem experienced by 
respondents in the past year was ‘anxiety and depression’ (72%), followed closely by ‘self-
confidence’ (71%), ‘sleep’ (70%) and ‘sex’ (68%), where ‘HIV stigma and discrimination 
were also common causes of problems, as were difficulties with status disclosure, which led 
to isolation, loneliness and fear of never finding someone to love’.130 Respondents’ identified 
that the ‘sources of such problems were often neighbours, work colleagues and those in wider 
social networks. Comments were variously rooted in homophobia, racism and HIV-related 
stigma’.131 The role of the criminal justice system in contributing to social exclusion has also 
been noted, where structural stigma is ‘problematic because it often intersects with structural 
homophobia and racism’.132 Interviewing HIV service providers, Dodds et al. found that ‘no 
one, when directly asked what they thought prosecutions accomplished in public health 
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terms, was able to describe a beneficial public health outcome’. This brings us back to a 
central question of this article: what is the purpose of criminalising the transmission of HIV? 
If the answer is to protect public health, in the opinion of those working with HIV positive 
people directly, it is failing. 
Because pandemics are necessarily social phenomena, they cannot be adequately 
prevented or understood at an individual level, a fact which demonstrates the criminal law’s 
limitations in helping to control or make sense of public health matters. The focus of liberal 
legal systems on the rational, choice-making at the individual-level will always be found 
wanting when the harms under consideration operate at a population-level. Indeed, the 
feasibility of attributing individual blame may be another reason that the transmission of HIV 
has been criminalised while coronavirus has not been. Therefore, a public health approach to 
HIV transmission is at odds with the punitive approach adopted by current law. The result of 
these two approaches being contradictory is that the law fails to prevent the harms it claims to 
address and that it compounds stigma, resulting in more harm to the health of HIV positive 
people.  
 
Social Harm and Stigma 
The study of social harms – zemiology – proposes that the individualism of criminal law is 
flawed as it cannot accurately account for, or fairly respond to, collective wrongdoing (e.g. 
corporate crimes). Drawing on postmodern and social constructivist ideas, zemiology has 
been championed by critical criminologists seeking to deconstruct performative categories 
such as ‘criminal’. This label is performative in the sense that it has no ontological basis 
beyond the lawmakers who communicate it to regulate, and thus construct, specific 
behaviours and identities. In short, the label ‘criminal’ can be applied to any act or person 
associated with a ‘crime’.133 The labelling of HIV transmission as a crime can therefore be 
complicated through a social harm perspective, which can also be used to highlight how the 
criminal justice system might itself perpetuate ‘more damaging and pervasive forms of 
harm’.134 Queer theory similarly observes that labels such as ‘homosexual’, as constructed by 
medicine and law, occur within an ever-shifting social landscape.135  
Drawing a distinction between personal criminalisation and regulatory 
criminalisation, Baker notes that while the criminal law can punish an individual’s ‘culpable 
choice to bring about bad consequences for others’, it is unable to punish collective entities 
(such as corporations or governments) for comparably harmful consequences, which can be 
significantly more harmful by qualitative or quantitative measures.136 When collective 
entities are held to account by regulatory criminalisation, through the levying of fines or 
revoking of licences, it ‘does not censure or blame an individual as opposed to a collective of 
individuals in a very indirect way, since it is the fictitious entity’ despite, in both cases, the 
criminal law being justified on grounds of harm prevention.137  
The social harm approach also allows for a ‘focus upon harms caused by chronic 
conditions or states of affairs’ beyond individual actions, including ‘institutionalised racism 
and homophobia’.138 However, national governments are unlikely to endorse this conceptual 
framework as ‘their activities (or inactivities) are likely to be highlighted as sources of 
harm’.139 Critical criminologists have further drawn attention to the role of the criminal law 
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in constructing certain behaviours as ‘harmful’ and people as ‘criminal’, without recognising 
the harms such forms of labelling can perpetuate. As Hillyard and Tombs note: 
Defining an event as a ‘crime’ either sets in motion, or is the product of, a process of 
criminalisation. The state – via the criminal justice system – appropriates the conflict 
and imposes punishment, of which the prison sentence is the ultimate option. 140  
They add that ‘these very processes create wider social harms which may bear little 
relationship to the original offence and pain caused’, including social inequality, ostracism, 
and stigma.141 Alongside physical harm, a social harm perspective considers economic, 
emotional, and sexual harms as alternatives to the ‘overly-individualistic’ approach of 
traditional law.142 As with medical definitions of harm provided above, zemiology considers 
the mental health consequences of stigma, as created by criminalisation. It highlights that 
‘crime is not just a question of who breaks the law, but also about who makes the law’,143 and 
that this cannot be considered separate from the wider socio-political context in which laws 
are made. Focusing on examples such as BDSM and body modification, Ramanauskas has 
argued that – rather than rational conceptions of consent or harm reduction – feelings of 
disgust have influenced decisions such as Brown and Wilson, to the extent that ‘the law has 
had an unacceptably disproportionate impact on marginalised groups in society’,144 including 
those who use illicit drugs, sex workers, and people living with HIV, among others.145 A 
social harm approach moves beyond the individualism of law and medicine to consider 
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humans as a social being, including the complexity of our desires and interactions, alongside 
the mechanisms of power which construct and constrain them. 
 
Conclusion 
Sexual risk, and sex more generally, has long preoccupied legislators and others engaged in 
debates over criminal justice.146 The ability of individual citizens to interact sexually with 
others throws a series of criminal law concepts, such as consent,147 risk, recklessness, and 
harm into a kaleidoscope, in which they might be examined and contested.  Yet, our framing 
of criminal law is often underpinned by transient moral and normative understandings which 
reflect the shifting attitudes of society. This is not to say that these concepts are necessarily 
understood or integrated into the law itself.  Rather, as Brooks has, we draw attention to the 
fact that research in the broader field of sexuality ‘suffers from distance from a sexual life’,148 
and the challenge for the criminal law is to understand and take account of the lived 
experience of sex and risk. 
The criminal law, and its focus upon a doctrinal dissection of sex, can lose sight of the 
human, the erotic, and the complex performance of bodies and their fluids, which tend to be 
silenced within legal discourse.149 By understanding these lived experiences, we can re-
introduce the human into the criminal law and prompt a re-evaluation of how the law 
operates. Key concepts – notably in the area of HIV transmission – relating to risk and harm 
need to be understood not merely in historical doctrinal terms, but as elements of people’s 
sexual lives in the present moment. As we elaborated in Part One,  in this moment, the 
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science has transformed the meaning of an HIV diagnosis while providing new (and 
outstandingly effective) tools to prevent transmission.  
Halperin has noted that HIV prevention requires ‘a miracle every day’ and that 
‘repetition is where miracle and history meet, and it is where, if anywhere, safe sex becomes 
habitual’.150  That repetition has arguably arrived in the form of PrEP and it has miraculous 
properties for transforming legal, medical, and social understandings of risk and sex. 
Together with TasP, the medical landscape through which risk can be pharmaceutically 
controlled is significantly different from that of even just five years ago. The science and 
healthcare provision relating to HIV is evolving rapidly. Our understanding of HIV is 
transformed through a reappraisal of the significance of medications (ART) which can be 
used as treatment and/or prevention. Whilst doctrinal law has failed to appreciate this shift, 
thus far, broader legal and activist narratives also lag in their conception of themes including 
consent and violence. 
The effects of PrEP and TasP on social attitudes towards sexuality arguably amount to 
a sexual revolution.  As Gonzalez noted, ‘the new sexual revolution may not appear 
revolutionary, in the wider public sphere, but it is slowly changing the queer cultural 
landscape’151. This is a cultural and health revolution that underlines the anachronistic nature 
of the law relating to HIV transmission.  Moreover, by maintaining a site of historic trauma, 
the criminal law is serving as a force that prevents a cultural healing that mirrors the health 
transformation that we have seen in recent years and, in doing so, sustains discourses of fear 
and stigma that are incongruous with contemporary understandings of HIV/AIDS in the 
sphere of law in England and Wales. Put simply, the science has changed, but the law has not 
kept pace. 
Hunter has previously observed the paradox that, with partial decriminalisation of 
homosexuality, there was also heightened scrutiny and regulation of ‘deviant’ sex.152   This 
informs the sex that men seek and engage in, and HIV transmission has been a powerful part 
of this narrative, amidst a broader context of equal rights discourse in which a new, 
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normative framework has been applied.153 The positioning of bareback sex as ‘risky’ or 
‘slutty’ situates it as behaviour that can attract stigma154 because – as noted above – of the 
continued attitudes perpetuated by doctrinal criminal law towards HIV, and STI transmission 
more broadly. However, as Fischel has argued, to resist law is not the same as resisting 
responsibility,155 and the changed medical landscape means that resistance to law is arguably 
the assertion of a new – medically and culturally informed – responsibility to each other. 
In this article, we have attempted to bring critical criminology, cultural theory, and 
health sociology into conversation with the criminal law as it pertains to HIV transmission. In 
contrast to the normative cascade that dominates discourse relating to the criminalisation of 
HIV and other STIs, a queering of this narrative that acknowledges non-monogamous 
relationships, reframes ‘slutdom’, and understands these relationship dynamics in a 
framework that is science-informed and culturally-aware would re-shape the criminal law in 
this area. Paradoxically, contemporary law finds itself acting perversely and against its own 
interests. The use of criminal law in cases of HIV transmission serves to punish the 
‘responsible’ behaviour of testing, treatment, and openness, while it privileges not knowing 
your status. As Sedgwick argued, ‘ignorance is as potent and as multiple a thing there as is 
knowledge’.156 Yet it is precisely this ignorance, sustained and supported by stigmatising 
criminalisation, that serves as the greatest risk for further HIV transmission. 
Alongside arguing that HIV transmission does not accrue the necessary harmfulness 
threshold to constitute GBH, we have drawn on this perspective to raise questions about 
whether criminalisation could be considered an additional harm; one which is unprincipled in 
legal terms, unnecessary in public health terms, and unjust in sociological terms. The social 
harm perspective is also critical of the notion of ‘risk society’ described by Beck, Giddens, 
and others, where ‘the control of dangerous populations is now a central concern of the penal 
system, and an actuarial criminology has replaced a rehabilitative criminology’.157 The 
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dichotomy between criminal justice and medical intervention is also open to critique from 
postmodern or queer theory, which has drawn attention to the ways in which both legal and 
medical discourses contribute to the othering, victimising, and stigmatising of HIV positive 
people and marginalised others. We are arguably at a point where a re-appraisal of doctrinal 
criminal law relating to HIV transmission is not merely overdue but also urgent. 
